Therefore, internal guidance could improve or reduce SPS protection and further analysis is needed to determine what the consequences will be. The net effect of internal alignment can significantly increase „good government“ while having a remarkably small impact on trade. Further assessment should facilitate the identification of SPS measures that achieve a certain level of protection with fewer trade restrictions. But more assessment can also support the development of alliances between proponents of strict SPS protection and others who want to restrict trade, which could lead to more SPS-related trade barriers. Greater attention to SPS issues around the world should lead to an international learning process focused on risk management. However, this process could lead to the acquisition of certain SPS measures considered „legitimate“ by the SPS Agreement and which also constitute particularly effective protectionist barriers to trade – for example, quarantine measures imposed by countries allowing the importer to impose „equal treatment“ on local and foreign production while effectively banning imports. Nations can also learn that protectionist measures do not violate the WTO, even if they serve plausible SPS protection objectives. In the case of Community hormones, for example, the Appellate Body ultimately did not state that the contradiction between the authorisation of the use of known carcinogens and the ban on growth hormones was incompatible with the SPS Convention. The Appellate Body asserted that the inconsistency was „arbitrary or unjustifiable“, but no evidence was provided that the difference was not contrary to the requirement of Article 2(3) of the SPS Convention: `plumbing. . Measures should not be applied in a manner that would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. The ban on hormones has had several effects – some legitimate The SPS agreement also requires countries to apply the least restrictive measures.

In two cases (Australian salmon, Japanese fruit and nuts), WTO bodies decided that other measures were available hourly, achieving the same level of SPS protection and significantly limiting trade. The fundamental logic of these findings has been maintained, although the Appellate Body has revoked itself for other reasons.75 Fortunately, we have associated a strong set of rules with an effective institution that sets and enforces both trade rules – the World Trade Organization (WTO). 164 countries, including all major trading nations, agreed on WTO rules and helped reduce trade barriers that fueled impressive trade growth and expansion of global income. The fundamental rules of the WTO are straight and intuitively fair. The wto`s most important element of SPS protection is the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The central objective of the agreement is to promote international trade by limiting the application of SPS measures as disguised trade barriers. The fundamental rights and obligations of the Agreement (Article 2) underline that WTO members have the right to impose spS measures when necessary „to protect human, animal or plant life or health“ (Articles 2.1 and 2.2). However, members shall not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between members; Nor may members use SPS measures as disguised barriers to trade (Article 2(3)). .

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